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Abstract
This paper characterizes optimal intercorporate guarantees, under the
classical trade-o⁄ between bankruptcy costs and taxation. Conditional
guarantees, allowing the guarantor - or Holding company - to maintain
limited liability vis-￿-vis the bene￿ciary - or Subsidiary - maximize joint
value. They indeed achieve the highest tax savings net of default costs.
We provide conditions ensuring that - at the optimum - guarantees in-
crease total debt, which bears mostly on the Subsidiary. This di⁄erence
in optimal leverage between Holding company and Subsidiary explains
why optimal conditional guarantees (i) generate value independently of
cash ￿ ow correlation (ii) are unilateral rather than mutual, at least for
moderate default costs (iii) dominate the unconditional ones, that are
embedded in mergers, at least when ￿rms have high cash-￿ ow correlation.
We also endogenize the choice of the guarantor, showing that it has higher
proportional bankruptcy costs, lower tax rates and bigger size.
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Corporations routinely guarantee the debt obligations of their subsidiaries1.
Despite being so common, it is not clear why such guarantees exist: while
providing gains to the Subsidiary (S), they generate a cost for the guaranteeing
Holding company (H) so that net value creation is expected to be zero. At
most one expects them to increase joint value to the extent that ￿rm cash ￿ ows
are less than perfectly correlated, because of diversi￿cation gains. Even in this
case, it remains unclear whether any given ￿rm should both provide and receive
support, or specialize in either being a guarantor or a bene￿ciary. Another set
of issues emerges if specialization obtains: which are the characteristics of the
￿rm providing support relative to that receiving it? And how much debt should
each one raise?
This paper analyzes intercorporate guarantees, that to our knowledge have
not been systematically addressed before, simply assuming - as in Leland (2007)
- that debt provides a tax shield but increases the likelihood of bankruptcy,
absent any information or incentive problems. Such absence allows to deal
with guarantees that are credible from the lenders￿point of view, for instance
because they are enforceable by law. Our main focus will be on conditional
guarantees, that allow the supporting Holding company to retain limited liability
with respect to the supported Subsidiary￿ s lenders. Corporate limited liability is
indeed the norm in major jurisdictions, according to the legal literature2. Also in
practice, companies tend to terminate support to a struggling subsidiary when
its needs are large with respect to group equity or when group pro￿ts turns
negative ((Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006); Gopalan et al. (2007); Emery
and Cantor (2005)).3
Our main result is that such guarantees increase the joint value of H and
S. Indeed, the Subsidiary is able to increase its debt ￿nancing and, as a conse-
quence, tax savings net of default costs. Numerical simulations show that S￿ s
tax savings can be four times as large as in the base case of no guarantees, while
its leverage can reach 99%, as in the seminal Modigliani and Miller analysis
without bankruptcy costs (Miller and Modigliani (1963)). Thus, a guarantee
has the e⁄ect of boosting tax avoidance, net of default costs. In more detail,
we provide analytical conditions for S￿ s debt to be higher than total debt of the
two ￿rms in the absence of any guarantee, and for H to be unlevered - so as to
increase its ability of providing support.
1See Bodie and Merton (1992) for US ￿rms and Chang and Hong (2000) for Korean chae-
bols. Deloof and Vershueren (2006) analyze contractual guarantees in Belgian groups, while
Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Gopalan et al. (2007) observe that Indian group ￿rms assist
each other in times of ￿nancial distress. Standard & Poor￿ s (2001) discusses how contractual
or implicit guarantees a⁄ect credit ratings.
2See Hadden (1996) on Britain, France, Germany and the US, and Hill (1996) on Australia.
This was already the case in US groups in the early twentieth century (Blumberg (1989)). The
exception to this rule is the ￿piercing of the corporate veil￿ that requires to prove both the
lack of separate existence of the subsidiary and parent company￿ s conduct ￿akin to fraud￿.
3Herring and Carmassi (2009) discuss recent instances when ￿nancial intermediaries walked
away from insolvent subsidiaries.
1The guarantee described until now is unilateral, while a priori support could
be mutual. We show that any given ￿rm specializes in either providing or re-
ceiving support, at least for moderate proportional default costs. The intuition
is that unilateral guarantees permit to save on both default costs and tax pay-
ments, thanks to both rescue and a di⁄erent leverage in the Holding company
and its Subsidiary. Mutual guarantees still save on default costs, but create
a tension because each ￿rm should at the same time increase its debt - since
it is guaranteed - and decrease it - in its quality of guarantor. This tension
results in lower total debt and tax savings than with unilateral guarantees. If
default costs are moderate, tax incentives - and the asymmetric leverage which
optimally exploits them thanks to unilateral guarantees - prevail.
The above conclusions on the properties of guarantees hold when Holding
company and Subsidiaries di⁄er in default costs, tax rates and size as well
as when they do not. Our next set of results concerns the characterization
of H and S when they do di⁄er. The guarantor H should be the ￿rm with
higher bankruptcy costs (lower tax rates), because its optimal debt - and hence
bankruptcy probability (foregone tax savings) - is lower. It should also be the
bigger one, as it is likelier to have larger cash ￿ ows available for rescue, reducing
S￿ s expected default costs relative to the opposite arrangement.
So far we have been discussing guarantees between two separately incor-
porated activities. These, we will argue in section 6, are common in business
groups and private equity funds and provide a rationale for their di⁄usion. In
the real world we also observe conglomerate Mergers (M), in which activities￿
cash ￿ ows are pooled so that they become jointly liable vis-￿-vis lenders. We
think of this as a case of an unconditional guarantee being provided by each
division to the other. Abstracting from any operational synergy, Leland (2007)
shows that a purely ￿nancial Merger destroys value in a number of situations,
when the loss of limited liability exceeds gains from higher optimal debt - for
instance when the high correlation between activities￿cash ￿ ows limits diversi-
￿cation opportunities. Below we show that conditional guarantees - of the HS
type - are value-enhancing relative to the M case in such situations. This result
highlights that, contrary to intuition, conditional guarantees work even when
cash ￿ ow diversi￿cation is limited, to the extent that the Holding company is
free to have lower debt and therefore higher cash-￿ ows available for supporting
its levered Subsidiary.
Last but not least, one may wonder whether these results have some real-
world counterparts. Since our theoretical ￿ndings are broadly consistent with
stylized observations on guarantees, leverage and ￿rm scope, we argue that
value creation due to intercorporate guarantees is able to explain the di⁄usion
of Holding-Subsidiary structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clari￿es our contri-
bution relative to previous theoretical literature. Section 3 lays out the model.
Section 4 analyzes how value and optimal debt change due to guarantees, pro-
viding the main results summarized above. Section 5 presents numerical sim-
ulations so as to appreciate the magnitude of the e⁄ects on debt, value, tax
savings and default costs. In section 6, we compare our ￿ndings with a number
2of related empirical observations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Previous literature
Our paper is closely related to the literature on non-synergistic ￿rm combina-
tions. Lewellen (1971) argues that merging imperfectly correlated Stand Alone
(SA) activities has a coinsurance e⁄ect that, by reducing the risk of default,
increases debt capacity, de￿ned as the amount that lenders are willing to o⁄er.
He then conjectures that this always leads to greater optimal debt, greater tax
savings, and value for the merged ￿rms. We argue that an increase in leverage
and tax savings obtains with an intercorporate conditional guarantee, as well.
We further show that this generates value irrespective of coinsurance gains, and
we provide analytical conditions ensuring greater optimal debt of HS relative to
the non-guaranteed SA case.
Leland (2007) constructs a structural model that is able to determine optimal
debt and the value of liabilities for Stand Alone ￿rms and the Merger. He
completes Lewellen￿ s argument by splitting the change in value from a Merger
into a pure limited-liability component and a leverage e⁄ect. The former is non-
positive and independent of leverage: it is the loss in limited liability pointed out
by Scott (1977) and Sarig (1985), that derives from the possibility of negative
operational cash ￿ ows. The latter is the sum of tax and default cost changes
associated with optimal leverage, and is positive only when there are coinsurance
gains. As a consequence, Leland observes that Mergers may reduce value and
provides conditions on Gaussian cash-￿ ows distribution ensuring that activities
either bene￿t or loose from a Merger. The case in which M is bene￿cial for any
correlation lower than one is very special: the volatilities of the merging ￿rms
must be identical and moderate. When volatilities di⁄er, or are identical but
large, Mergers are undesirable at high correlations.
We embed the Merger case into a more general structural model, where cash
￿ ows have any (even non-Gaussian) distribution function and ￿rm combinations
encompass the HS case too. For this model we get analytical results on value
enhancement with respect to both the Stand Alone and the Merger case. We
￿rst show that a conditional guarantee never destroys value. This is because
the Holding company can commit to support its insolvent Subsidiary conditional
on its own survival, thanks to corporate limited liability. Secondly, and conse-
quently, we argue that a conditional guarantee is worth introducing when the
unconditional guarantee deriving from a Merger is wasteful. Thirdly, we provide
analytical results for larger optimal HS leverage - and larger value gains due
to lower taxes net of default costs - as opposed to numerical computations in
previous work.
The relevance of limited liability links our study also to previous work em-
phasizing this trait of business groups (Cestone and Fumagalli (2005) and Bianco
and Nicodano (2006)). Both papers focus on incentive issues, instead of a tax-
bankruptcy trade-o⁄, and posit exogenous debt needs. In the ￿rst paper the
bene￿t of groups stems from improved managerial e⁄ort that impacts on com-
3petition in the output market. The second paper characterizes the fraction of
exogenous group debt to raise through a Subsidiary, when this stimulates risk
shifting. Thus, neither paper uncovers the ￿rst order e⁄ects on debt, tax savings
and ultimately ￿rm value that lie at the heart of the current research.
Our reliance on tax bene￿ts connects our paper to a large literature on
tax avoidance and corporate ￿nance (see the survey in Graham (2003)), which
focusses on arbitrage in unequal tax rates. For instance, multinational groups
raise more debt from subsidiaries in high-tax countries (Huizinga et al. (2008)).
In our model, guarantees minimize the tax burden - net of default costs - even
with equal tax rates across ￿rms. Thus, we point out a powerful tax avoidance
tool which, to our knowledge, has not been analyzed yet.
Last but not least, our paper owes to Merton (1977), who recognizes that
the provision of a guarantee for all the debt of a company - with no corporate
limited liability - is akin to the issue of a put option on that company assets,
and prices it accordingly. We observe that a conditional guarantee is akin to
an option on the Subsidiary￿ s cash ￿ ows. We price it accordingly, taking into
consideration its e⁄ects on optimal capital structure.
3 The model
We consider a no arbitrage environment with two dates t = f0;Tg, in which
every payo⁄ is evaluated according to its expected discounted value, under the
risk neutral measure. This basic set up is drawn from Leland (2007).
An entrepreneur owns two production units4 Each activity i (i = 1;2) gen-
erates a random operating cash ￿ ow Xi at time T. Xi is a continuous random
variable, endowed with the ￿rst two moments (Xi 2 L2), that may take both
negative and positive values.5 We also assume that the joint density of the cash
￿ ows Xi - denoted as f(x;y) - exists and is positive on the whole plane6:The
owner can ￿walk away￿ from negative cash ￿ ows thanks to personal limited
liability. The unlevered ￿rm value is V0i = (1 ￿ ￿)￿EX
+
i ; where X
+
i is the
positive part of Xi, ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ , (1 + rT)￿1; and rT is the
riskless rate for the time span T.
At time zero the entrepreneur can lever up each ￿rm by issuing a zero-coupon
debt. Let the debt principal be Pi ￿ 0: Assume it is due, with absolute priority,
at T. The value at time 0 of such debt, D0i, is cashed-in by the entrepreneur
at issuance. We assume that there is an incentive to issue debt, as interest is a
deductible expense. The promised interest payment is equal to:
Pi ￿ D0i (1)
Taxable income is the operating one net of interests, Xi ￿ (Pi ￿ D0i), when
4Please notice that, at t > 0, the entrepreneur, after having raised debt so as to maximize
￿rm value, can also sell part of his own equity .
5Denote as Fi its distribution function; this means 0 < Fi(0) < 1:
6This rules out the cases of linear correlation exactly equal to -1 and 1, which can be
treated numerically.
4positive. The zero-tax level of cash ￿ ow, XZ
i , is therefore equal to:
XZ
i = Pi ￿ D0i (2)
A positive tax rate ￿ > 0 applies when Xi > XZ
i . Operating cash ￿ ows, net
of tax payments, are X
+
i ￿ ￿(Xi ￿ XZ






0 Xi < 0
Xi 0 < Xi < XZ
i
Xi(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿XZ
i Xi > XZ
i
(3)
However, issuing debt has costs as well. Similarly to Merton (1974), default
occurs when net operating cash ￿ ow is smaller than the principal, namely Xn
i <
Pi. The default triggering condition can be restated as Xi < Xd
i ; where the
default threshold Xd
i is de￿ned as:
Xd








In the event of default, we assume that a fraction ￿ > 0 of operating cash
￿ ows is lost. Bondholders will receive a fraction 0 < 1 ￿ ￿ < 1 of operating
cash ￿ ow, Xi, when this is positive. They must pay taxes when Xi > XZ
i .
There is then a trade-o⁄ between the dissipative default costs, ￿Xi, and the
tax savings possibly generated by debt. As customary in the related literature,
we are assuming that cash ￿ ows are exogenous, that the ￿rm receives no tax
refunds when they are negative7 and that bankruptcy costs as proportional to
cash-￿ ows.
The entrepreneur chooses the non-negative face value of debt, Pi, in the two
activities, given this tax-bankruptcy cost trade-o⁄, so as to maximize the time-
zero combined value of the two units. He can also allow one or both units to
guarantee the lenders of the other activity.
The combined value is given by the sum of the two ￿rms￿equities and debts,







E0i + D0i =
2 X
i=1
￿E[Ei + Di] (5)
where Ei + Di are the payo⁄s at time T;E is the risk-neutral expectation
operator. Tedious algebra shows that, for each and every guarantee, the levered
values ￿0i coincide with the value of the unlevered ￿rm, V0i; plus tax savings
from interest deduction, TSi; less the present value of default costs, DCi
8:
7In the real world, companies may carry forward some losses, in order to reduce the asym-
metric nature of taxation - which however remains substantial.
8In the absence of guarantees, the proof is given in Leland (2007). In the presence of them,
it can be given only once appropriate expressions for DCs are introduced (see later sections).
5￿0i = V0i + TSi ￿ DCi (6)
Tax savings TSi are equal to the discounted di⁄erential tax burden of the
unlevered and the levered ￿rm, which are denoted as Ti(0) and Ti respectively:




i ￿ E(Xi ￿ XZ
i )+￿
(7)
Given these de￿nitions, levered ￿rm value can be written as
￿0i = V0i + Ti(0) ￿ Ti ￿ DCi = ￿EX
+
i ￿ Ti ￿ DCi (8)
Since both unlevered ￿rm value and its tax burden are independent of lever-
age, the value maximization problem coincides with that of minimizing the
tax burden plus default costs, through an appropriate choice of the principals





(Ti + DCi) (9)
Two key points for understanding this problem - and how it di⁄ers across guar-
antees - are the following. First, for each ￿rm, the tax burden has the same
expression, namely Ti = E(Xi ￿ XZ
i )+, independently of the guarantees. How-
ever, it has not the same value, for given principal: Ti depends on the tax shield,
XZ = P ￿ D0, which in turn depends on the market value of debt, D0. The
latter is determined as the present value of its payo⁄s Di, which are a⁄ected
by the guarantees. As a consequence, for any given principal, Ti di⁄ers across
guarantees because D0 does. Second, default costs DCi have a di⁄erent expres-
sion across guarantees because the provision of support a⁄ects them. On top
of that, costs di⁄er across guarantees because, similarly to taxes, they depend
on the thresholds Xd and XZ. The latter depend on D0, which has di⁄erent
expressions across guarantees. So, in spite of the common formalization of ￿rm
value, (9), its dependence on the principals is di⁄erent across guarantees. Below
we will outline such dependence by working out the debt holders￿payo⁄ and
default costs over guarantee types.
3.1 No guarantees
When there are no guarantees, ￿rms coincide with the Stand Alone activities in





(1 ￿ ￿)Xi 0 < Xi < XZ
i
(1 ￿ ￿)Xi ￿ ￿(Xi ￿ XZ
i ) XZ
i < Xi < Xd
i
Pi Xi > Xd
i
(10)
9The payo⁄ to equity holders is: Ei(Pi) = (Xn
i ￿Pi)+. Its present discounted value E0i is
a call option with underlying Xn
i and exercise price Pi: Debt instead is a portfolio of plain
vanilla puts and the present value of the principal.
6When ￿rm i is insolvent, lenders receive cash ￿ ows net of bankruptcy costs,
(1￿￿)Xi; if gross cash ￿ ows are positive but lower than the tax shield, i.e. Xi <
XZ
i : When cash ￿ ows exceed the tax shield but fall short the default threshold,
that is XZ
i < Xi < Xd
i ; the government has priority for tax payments, and
debtholders also bear a tax liability, ￿(Xi￿XZ
i ): Lenders receive reimbursement
equal to Pi when the ￿rm is solvent, i.e. Xi > Xd
i . These in￿ ows make Di
de￿ned implicitly, since the zero-tax and default thresholds XZ
i and Xd
i depend
on its present value. Fixed points arguments apply to both the theoretical and
numerical characterization of the latter.
Without external support the ￿rm defaults as soon as its gross cash ￿ ows
fall short the default threshold, Xi < Xd







where 1f￿g is the indicator function.
Appendix A proves that the market value of debt increases less than pro-
portionally with respect to its face value, and that both the tax shield and the
default threshold also increase in the face value of debt, as intuition suggests.
As a consequence, default costs increase in the face value of debt, because the
set of default states gets larger. As for the tax burden, it is decreasing in both
the tax shield and the face value of debt. The latter enlarges interest deduc-
tions and the associated tax shield, increasing default costs but alleviating the
tax burden. In other words, the tax burden is a call option on Xi with strike
XZ
i . The call is decreasing in the principal, since the strike is increasing in it.
Default costs are a barrier call option on Xi with zero strike and barriers equal
to zero and Xd
i . The call is increasing in the principal, since the upper barrier
is increasing in it.
Appendix A studies the ensuing trade-o⁄ and proves that, under the stan-
dard convexity assumptions on the objective of minimization, the Stand Alone
￿rm is always levered. If we denote its optimal debt as P￿
i , we have:
Lemma 3.1 If the tax burden and default costs Ti + DCi are convex in the
principal Pi, the Stand Alone company is optimally levered: P￿
i > 0;i = 1;2:
3.2 Conditional guarantee
This section models a guarantee between a Holding company and its Subsidiary,
studies its properties and assesses their e⁄ects on lenders￿payo⁄s. For the sake
of comparison, we posit that cash ￿ ows are equal to the Stand Alone case, i.e.
that XH = X1; XS = X2.
We start from unilateral guarantees, postponing the case of mutual guaran-
tees. The key feature of these guarantees is corporate limited liability, as we
argued in the introduction. This implies that the Holding company provides
support if two conditions hold. First, the cash ￿ ows of the defaulting company
7are non negative, else the guarantor would bear an operating loss that it can
avoid by using its limited liability:
0 < XS < Xd
S (12)
Second, joint cash ￿ ows are su¢ cient to honour all debt obligations:
Xn
H ￿ PH > PS ￿ Xn
S (13)










S ￿ XS XS > XZ
S
(14)




where the term in curly brackets represents the "rescue area", i.e. the cash-
￿ ow combinations which lead to rescue.
We now determine how the transfer changes both the payo⁄s to the lenders
and the default costs with respect to the Stand Alone case.
















The ￿rst square bracket refers to the case when the Subsidiary defaults and
the Holding company does not support it because its own cash ￿ ow is insu¢ cient.
In this situation, lenders have to pay taxes only if cash ￿ ows exceed the tax
shield. The second square bracket takes into account that the Subsidiary is
able to reimburse its debt either when it is solvent on its own or thanks to
the Holding company transfer.For ￿xed principals, the payo⁄ to the Holding
company￿ s lenders does not change with respect to the Stand Alone case, as it
provides support to the Subsidiary only after the service of its own debt. Thus
H￿ s debt is una⁄ected: DH(PH) = D1(PH). 10
Moreover, H default costs are una⁄ected as it provides support only if sol-
vent. On the contrary, the guarantee reduces the Subsidiary￿ s default costs - for







10So is the value of H equity. The payo⁄ to S shareholders instead becomes:
h
(Xn





8For any debt level of H and S, denote with ￿ the savings in (expected,
discounted) default costs of the Subsidiary with respect to the no-guarantee
case:






These savings are akin to an option on the Subsidiary￿ s cash ￿ ows. It is
non-negative and becomes strictly positive as soon as PS > 0: Appendix B
establishes the other properties of ￿. It is non-increasing in the Holding company
debt. Indeed, for any joint cash ￿ ow distribution and any capital structure,
reducing debt in the Holding company enlarges - or at least does not shrink -
its ability to provide support, and consequently default costs of the Subsidiary.
The e⁄ect associated with changes in Subsidiary debt is less obvious. Raising
PS contributes to such savings by increasing the value of S cash ￿ ows that are
saved when H succeeds in rescuing it. On the other hand, raising PS reduces
savings by making it less likely that H cash ￿ ows will be su¢ cient to service S
debt. When debt in the Subsidiary diverges, the second e⁄ect dominates and
the marginal value of savings is negative.
Appendix B proves that - as a consequence of the properties of ￿ - the
optimal principal of the Subsidiary is positive, exactly as in the no-guarantee
case.
Lemma 3.2 If TH +DCH +TS +DCS is convex in the principals PH;PS, the
Subsidiary is optimally levered: P￿
S > 0:
Remark 3.1 From the lemma, which entails Xd
S > 0, together with f(x;y) >0,
it follows that the rescue area is non-empty and the probability associated to
rescue is non-null.
So far we have been addressing the case of only one ￿rm supporting the
other. It is however possible for the entrepreneur to establish a mutual, but
still conditional, guarantee. This is composed of a guarantee from H to its
S - as above - and by a guarantee from S to its H - which is triggered by
the fact that 0 < XH < Xd
H; XS > h(XH). Default costs of both ￿rms
are now reduced with respect to the Stand-Alone case. They coincide with
those obtained with unilateral guarantee for the Subsidiary; for the Holding
company they have a symmetric expression. Denote as ￿m the overall savings
in (expected, discounted) default costs which a mutual conditional guarantee








One can recognize that they can be split into the values of the corresponding
unilateral savings (from H to S and viceversa). Name the two parts ￿12 ,
DCS ￿ DC2 = ￿ and ￿21 , DCH ￿ DC1.
The expression for S debt - DS(PH;PS) - is unchanged with respect to
the unilateral guarantee case described above. Debt of the Holding company
9- denoted as D
￿m
H (PH;PS) - di⁄ers instead because now the Holding company




















The entrepreneur may also decide that both ￿rms will transfer their cash ￿ ows
unconditionally to each other, i.e. that they will be jointly liable vis-￿-vis all
lenders. We consider the Merger (M) case in Leland (2007) as the case of
unconditional guarantees.
The Merger value obtains when substituting into equation (6) both the cash
￿ ow XM = X1 + X2 and the debt PM > 0. The expressions for both lenders￿
payo⁄s and default costs similarly obtain from equations (10) and (11). Thus,
we can replicate the proof in Lemma 3.1 to demonstrate that the optimal Merger
debt is always positive, P￿
M > 0, under the usual convexity assumption.
4 Main results: guarantees and debt
4.1 Conditional guarantees versus no guarantee
This section examines whether and how conditional guarantees create value with
respect no guarantees, starting with unilateral ones.
We do establish that such guarantees create value, absent any assumption
on the correlation of the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow, and we split such an increase into
a limited liability, a rescue and a leverage component. We also show that,
at the optimum, the Holding company is less levered than before o⁄ering the
guarantee, the intuition being that this increases its chances of being able to
provide support (theorem 4.3). Under convexity, we further show that the
Holding company is unlevered (theorem 4.2) and that the Subsidiary￿ s principal
is greater than the sum of the debts of the original Stand Alone companies. In
other words, we show that guarantees increase total optimal debt of the two
companies.
In the light of the general expression (8), the combined value of the ￿rms
cum-guarantee is equal to:
￿0HS(PH;PS) = ￿EX
+
H ￿ TH ￿ DCH + ￿EX
+
S ￿ TS ￿ DCS
We call "value of the guarantee" the di⁄erence between this combined value
and the sum of the two Stand Alone ￿rms￿values. Theorem 4.1 shows that it
is positive:
10Theorem 4.1 Conditional guarantees are value increasing with respect to no
guarantees (weakly , if TH +DCH +TS +DCS is not convex in the principals).
Proof. The value of the guarantee can be formalized as
￿01(PH) + ￿02(PS) + ￿(PH;PS) ￿ ￿01(P1) ￿ ￿02(P2) (22)
Suppose that the HS maintains the initial debt levels (PH = P￿
1 ;PS = P￿
2 ).
Since ￿01(PH) = ￿01(P￿
1 );￿02(PS) = ￿02(P￿




2 ) ￿ ￿01 (P￿
1 ) ￿ ￿02 (P￿





2 ) > 0 since P￿
2 > 0 (￿ 0 if no convexity is required). For the
suboptimal principals PH = P￿
1 ;PS = P￿
2 the value of the guarantee is then
positive (non-negative). A fortiori it is positive (non-negative) when principals
of the guarantor and guaranteed company are optimized, PH = P￿
H;Ps = P￿
S.
We now split the optimal value of the guarantee into three components.
The ￿rst term is the di⁄erence in the unlevered ￿rm value, which is the "limited
liability e⁄ect" de￿ned in Leland (2007). The second one is the reduction in
default costs due to rescue, when leverage - and hence the tax burden - is the
same as in the Stand Alone case. The last term is the increase in value associated
with the possibility of levering up more thanks to the guarantee.
￿0HS (P￿
H;P￿
S) ￿ ￿01 (P￿
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It is easy to show that the ￿rst term is zero, because there is no loss in limited
liability when shifting from two Stand Alone ￿rms to a Holding Subsidiary
structure. The proof of the above theorem shows that the second and third
term are positive (or non negative).
The next theorem studies how debt levels in Holding company and Sub-
sidiary di⁄er from their Stand Alone counterparts.
Theorem 4.2 Under the convexity assumption, i) the Holding company is op-
timally unlevered (P￿
H = 0); ii) the Subsidiary principal - and, a fortiori, the HS





if and only if the ratio of default costs to the tax rate is bounded above by a
constant Q:
Proof. See Appendix B, which also provides the expression for Q.
Clearly, tax savings increase in total debt, which optimally coincides with
Subsidiary￿ s debt since setting PH to zero reduces both H and S default costs.
We saw that increasing PS may reduce H ability to support S, thus increasing
default costs. The Q condition ensures that marginal tax gains exceed marginal
default costs at PH + PS = P￿
1 + P￿
2 :
11Another version of this theorem, which does not require convexity, is proved
in Appendix B too. In the ￿rst part it also claims that there is a shift of
debt from the guarantor to the guaranteed party.11 However, it need not entail
zero leverage for the Holding company. The second part provides an alternative
condition for higher optimal debt.
Theorem 4.3 (i) the entrepreneur creates value by decreasing the Holding com-
pany debt below P￿
1 and increasing the Subsidiary debt above P￿
2 ; (ii) provided
that the value of the guarantee is decreasing in PS at P￿





2 )=@PH, then the overall optimal debt is greater than P￿
1 + P￿
2 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
In our numerical experiments, which are built on the Leland (2007) BBB
parametrization, we ￿nd results consistent with both theorems 4.2 and 4.3 for
equally distributed cash ￿ ows (X1 = X2), while they are consistent only with
theorem 4.3 for cash ￿ ows that di⁄er in size (X1 = 5X2).
To anticipate on observational ￿ndings that we describe in section 6, Masulis
et al. (2008) ￿nd that group a¢ liates and Holding companies are respectively
more and less levered than comparable Stand Alone ￿rms, in line with with
both propositions.
4.2 On mutual conditional guarantees
This section clari￿es the reason why we have so far focussed on a unilateral
guarantee. In principle, each ￿rm can grant support to the other, but this turns
out to be dominated by unilateral support, at least for moderate default costs.
Theorem 4.4 ￿rst highlights that the value of the HS structure achieves local
maxima when only one ￿rm is levered and, therefore, the guarantee is unilateral.
It then provides a condition ensuring that mutual guarantees are not optimal.
Theorem 4.4 Unilateral guarantees maximize the combined value of H and
S. There exists a default cost level ￿￿ below which they are the only optimal
guarantees.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for this result is the following. Unilateral guarantees permit
to save on tax payments net of default costs by concentrating debt in the bene-
￿ciary, which allows to increase overall leverage. With mutual guarantees each
￿rm should instead both increase its debt - since it receives support - and
decrease it - in its quality of guarantor. This tension results in lower total
debt and tax savings. The theorem indicates that it is not pro￿table to give
11The intuition for the transfer of debt from H to S is straightforward. Without any guar-
antee, marginal tax savings equal marginal default costs at debt levels P￿
1 ;P￿
2 . With the
guarantee, the marginal cost of H debt is higher (because it reduces net cash ￿ows available
for rescue), while the marginal default cost associated with S debt is lower (because of the
rescue by H). It follows that debt in H (S) must fall (increase) in order to re-establish equality
with tax savings, thus PH < P￿
1 and PS > P￿
2 .
12up the increase in overall debt which unilateral guarantees permit, at least if
default costs are moderate: tax incentives - and the asymmetric leverage which
optimally exploits them - prevail.
The previous theorem does not shed light on the respective features of the
￿rm providing or receiving support. This leads us to characterize the ideal
Holding company in the following section.
4.3 Which ￿rm provides support?
In the previous sections we assumed that a company, called the Holding com-
pany, was providing a guarantee. In this section we explicitly consider di⁄erent
characteristics for ￿rms 1 and 2; and ￿nd conditions ensuring that it is optimal






where the left-hand side (rhs) is de￿ned as total HS value when 1 supports 2 (2
supports 1). Notice that P￿
iH ( P￿
iS) is the optimal debt of ￿rm i when it acts
as Holding company (Subsidiary).
Observe that the inequality (23) can be written as:
TG1 + DCG1 < TG2 + DCG2 (24)
where TGi and DCGi are the incremental tax burden and default costs when












iS); j 6= i
Firm 1 should provide support if and only if it has smaller incremental tax
burden net of default costs, relative to ￿rm 2. It is now easy to demonstrate
that:
Proposition 4.1 i) If X1 = X2 (in distribution) and tax rates as well as default
costs are equal across the two ￿rms, then each ￿rm can either provide or receive
support; (ii) under the convexity assumption, ￿rm 1 supports ￿rm 2 if - all
others equal - it has a higher percentage default cost (￿1 > ￿2) or a lower















Proof. See Appendix B.
Why do we relate the last part of the previous proposition to size? With
Gaussian distributions higher mean cash ￿ ows (which we can think of as a
13proxy for size) map into higher expected positive cash ￿ ows.12 With general






a) a bigger Stand Alone levers up more than a smaller one, i.e. P￿
1 > P￿
2 ; a




b) as a consequence of di⁄erent debts, the default thresholds di⁄er too. In





the set of states when the bigger Subsidiary defaults exceeds the set in which
the smaller Holding defaults.













d) we also expect the set of states when a smaller Holding does not support
its bigger Subsidiary, X2 < h(X1); to be larger than the one over which the
converse holds, X1 < h(X2). This observation and c) make condition (25)





The theorem suggests that the Holding company is the ￿rm with larger cash
￿ ows available for support. In the case of equal cash ￿ ow distributions, H is the
one that would lever up less even as stand alone, because of lower tax rates or
higher default costs. With unequal cash ￿ ow distribution but equal ￿ and ￿, it
is the bigger ￿rm.
Another remark is in order. It will be clear by now that the Holding company
does not necessarily own its Subsidiary in our set up, as we sidestep intercor-
porate ownership for simplicity13. However, it is straightforward to consider
an alternative organization in which an unlevered super-holding company owns
100% of both H and S. The super-holding company indirectly provides the guar-
antee to S by collecting cash ￿ ows and distributing them as in the direct case
addressed so far. That is, this indirect case leads to the same optimal guarantor
H described in Proposition 4.1 and the same capital structure of Theorem 4.2.
4.4 Unconditional guarantees
Leland (2007) points out that merging two ￿rms, i.e. introducing an uncondi-
tional guarantee between two ￿rms, may reduce their joint value. We now show
that, in such situations, it is still possible to create value through a unilateral
conditional guarantee, if correlation is high. This is the content of theorem 4.5
below.




xn(x)dx = ￿N(￿=￿) + ￿n(￿￿=￿)
where N and n are the distribution and density functions of a standard normal. This expec-
tation is increasing in the mean - as one can check by computing @EX+=@￿ = N(￿=￿) > 0:
13The case with intercorporate dividends is available from the authors upon request.
14Theorem 4.5 Unilateral conditional guarantees are value increasing (non de-
creasing, if convexity does not hold) with respect to a Merger if either (i) activi-
ties cash ￿ows are equal and perfectly correlated, or (ii) they are Gaussian, with
￿Q < ￿ ￿ 1 and (common) volatility ￿>￿L; where ￿L = argmin￿￿(PM) or (iii)
they are Gaussian, with ￿R < ￿ ￿ 1 and distinct volatilities: ￿H 6= ￿S.
Proof. See Appendix B. ￿Q and ￿R are characterized in Leland.
Leland (2007) shows that a Merger is value decreasing - at least for high
volatility, i.e. ￿>￿L - when diversi￿cation gains disappear, i.e. when cash ￿ ow
correlation across two equal activities is perfect. Case (i) strikingly implies that
- with perfect correlation and independently of the level of volatility - gains from
the conditional guarantee obtain: the Holding company is still able to rescue
S because its own debt is optimally lower than S￿ s. Debt diversity - i.e., the
fact that H and S have distinct principals - preserves the value of the guarantee
when diversi￿cation opportunities vanish, independently of volatility. In cases
(ii) and (iii), Leland (2007) shows that the loss in limited liability - due to the
Merger - is large enough to make it less desirable than separation. A fortiori -
due to theorem 4.1 - a Merger is less desirable than a HS structure.
5 Numerical analysis
We now turn turn to simulations, for four reasons. First, they will allow us
to appreciate the magnitude of the e⁄ects of conditional guarantees on debt,
value, tax burdens, default costs and leverage, i.e. the ratio between the market
value of debt and the market value of the ￿rm. The second reason for looking
at simulations is to assess the robustness of our results when we relax the as-
sumption of convexity, which is necessary and su¢ cient in the analytical results
we provided for general cash ￿ ow distributions. We will see below that capital
structure and value rankings align with our predictions, even if - in this example
- convexity does not hold in the whole domain. The third motivation is that we
can get some insight on the case, which we cannot treat analytically, of di⁄erent
risk across ￿rms. Finally, we will also assess whether asymmetry in bankruptcy
costs, volatility or size makes guarantees more valuable with respect to the case
of equal ￿rms. Throughout, we impose the assumption of Gaussian cash ￿ ows
so as to compare our results with those of Leland.
5.1 Equal Firms
The base-case parameters also coincide with Leland￿ s. The horizon T is 5 years,
the per-annum interest rate - which, under no arbitrage, determines also the cash
￿ ow return - is 5%. When ￿rms are equal, as in Table 1, operating cash ￿ ow for
each activity has expected present value X0 = 100, annual volatility ￿ = 22 and
expected ￿nal gross returns ￿ = 127:6. Annual cash ￿ ows are independently
distributed over time. The correlation coe¢ cient between the units￿cash ￿ ows
￿ is set equal to 0.2. The tax rate, ￿ = 20%, and the default cost parameter,
15￿ = 23%; generate optimal leverage and recovery rates consistent with a BBB
￿rm issuing unsecured debt. In Table 1 the ￿rst column refers to a Stand Alone
￿rm. The second, third and fourth columns refer to a Holding company, a
Subsidiary and an "average" of H and S respectively, while the last column to
half of a conglomerate. All ￿gures must be interpreted as percentages of the
present value of cash ￿ ow.
The optimal face value of debt, which is equal to 57.1 in a Stand Alone
￿rm, reaches 220 in the Subsidiary, raising its leverage from 51.81 to 99.9. The
Holding company is optimally unlevered, thus debt almost doubles in the average
HS, reaching 110. This increases its expected tax savings by more than expected
default costs (from 2.32 to 7.31 and from 0.89 to 4.07 respectively). As a result,
the average ￿rm value (83.29) exceeds the one of a ￿rm without guarantees
(81.47), resulting in a value of the guarantee equal to 3.64. In contrast, the
value of half a Merger is only slightly larger than that of a Stand Alone (81.57),
with a value of the unconditional guarantee of 0.2. However, the Merger entails
both lower tax savings (2.18) and lower default costs (0.61).
The previous e⁄ects on leverage and value are not limited to the case of low
cash ￿ ow correlation underlying Table 1. In Figure 1 (bottom right panel) we
see that the face value of debt in HS grows much larger than without guarantees
as the correlation coe¢ cient ￿ increases from -0.8 to 0.8. Tax savings increase
almost linearly in the correlation coe¢ cient, while default cost increase at a
decreasing rate. Indeed, high correlation means that the unlevered Holding has
huge cash ￿ ows available for rescue precisely when its highly levered Subsidiary
would also incur into important default costs because of its own huge cash ￿ ows.
Thus, HS value - and the value of the guarantee - is also increasing in correlation.
In Mergers, the advantages of diversi￿cation increase as correlation falls. But
even with correlation as low as -0.8, the value of HS exceeds that of Mergers.
5.2 Di⁄erent Firms
Numerical results so far refer to the base-case of identical activities, while we
now allow them to di⁄er in either proportional bankruptcy costs (￿), cash ￿ ow
volatility (￿), or size (￿). The results described below refer to cash-￿ ow corre-
lation equal to 0.2, but hold as well for the unreported range [￿0:8;+0:8]:
Table 2 refers to activities with proportional default costs respectively equal
to 23%, as in the base case, and 75%. With larger bankruptcy costs, the optimal
value of a Stand Alone ￿rm drops from 81.47 (see the second column) to 80.83
(￿rst column) as its face value of debt reduces from 57.1 to 33. As a consequence,
the average Stand Alone ￿rm in the third column has debt equal to 45.05, with
lower tax savings of 1.79 and lower default costs of 0.68. Its value drops to
81.15. In the case of HS, by contrast, we know by Proposition 4.1 that the
activity with larger bankruptcy costs is the Holding company, which is optimally
unlevered even when bankruptcy costs are eas low as 23%. Unsurprisingly, it
is still unlevered when it has higher default costs. Hence both the optimal
capital structure and HS value do not change. The Merger case is intermediate,
with debt, tax savings, default costs and value falling relative to the symmetric
16case (respectively to 46.5, 1.69, 0.17 and 81.24). The value of the Merger stays
higher than in the average Stand Alone. Let us now assess how asymmetric
default costs a⁄ect the value of the guarantees. The value of the conditional
guarantees grows in DC diversity, from 3.64 in Table 1 to 4.29 in Table 2, while
the unconditional one falls from 0.20 to 0.17 - possibly because of lack of debt
diversity.
Table 3 concerns the case of di⁄erent risk. We design it so as to keep total
￿rm volatility constant for ￿rm combinations, when the 0.2 correlation coe¢ -
cient is accounted for. To do so, we consider one ￿rm having 15% volatility while
the other has 27.52%. The average Stand Alone ￿rm raises more debt than the
￿rm in the base case (60.5 versus 57.10), its value slightly increases (81.70 in-
stead of 81.47) as well as its tax savings (2.47 instead of 2.32) relative to default
costs (0.9 versus 0.89). Figures for the Merger case do not change, as volatility
parameters are set so as to keep total M volatility constant. What changes,
though, is the value di⁄erential relative to the Stand Alone case: the value of
the unconditional guarantee drops to -0.26, because loss of limited liability is
now larger due to the di⁄erent cash ￿ ow volatility of units.
On the contrary, the value of the conditional guarantee climbs to 4.32. This
occurs despite a fall in debt and tax savings relative to the base case ( from
110 to 107.5; and from 7.31 to 6.87) coupled with a reduction in default costs
(from 4.07 to 3.15). Intuitively, the conditional guarantee is an option with two
separate underlyings, which bene￿ts from their di⁄erent volatilities even when
the overall volatility is kept constant.
Finally, Table 4 describes the case of di⁄erent size: the expected cash ￿ ow of
one ￿rm is ￿ve times the other, keeping the total present value equal to 200. In
the SA case, the larger (lower) ￿rm has higher (lower) debt, tax savings, default
costs and value. As a result, the average Stand Alone almost coincides with the
base case one.
As for HS, we know from Proposition 4.1 that the larger ￿rm must be the
guarantor. For the ￿rst time we see that such a large Holding company raises
debt as well, so as to reduce its own tax burden, without compromising the
provision of support to its Subsidiary, that remains 100% levered. With respect
to the base case, the HS has lower debt, lower tax savings and lower default costs
The asymmetric Merger also has lower debt, but this translates into higher tax
savings (because the unreported value of debt goes down more than the face
value of debt, increasing the tax shield) and higher default costs. In all the
organizations, value does not increase relative to the equally distributed case
(SA stays constant at 162.94; HS falls from 166.58 to 166.13 and M from 163.14
to 162.98).
What is the impact of size asymmetry on guarantees? Di⁄erently from the
previous two cases, the value of the conditional guarantee falls from 3.44 to 3.19.
Unreported simulations show that this obtain when the value di⁄erence exceeds
a certain threshold. For instance, when H is 4/3 and S is 2/3, the value of
the guarantee is higher than in the base case.14 The value of the unconditional
14In this paper the size of HS components is exogenous. By endogenising it, we would never
17guarantee does not become negative as in the case of asymmetric volatility, but
falls from 0.2 to 0.04.
The following proposition summarizes our main numerical ￿ndings:
Conclusion 1 Consider BBB calibrated companies and cash ￿ow correlation
￿ 2 [-0:8;0:8]. Then (i) Subsidiary leverage may reach up to 100%; (ii) con-
ditional guarantees are value increasing but generate much higher tax savings
and default costs than both unconditional and no guarantees; (iii) when cash
￿ow volatility di⁄ers across ￿rms, the Holding company company is the safer
one; (iv) the Holding company is also levered when the size di⁄erence exceeds
a certain threshold; (v) the value of the conditional guarantee may increase in
bankruptcy costs, risk and size asymmetries between activities.
6 Intercorporate guarantees in practice
The current section relates our model to stylized empirical facts. After chal-
lenging our main assumption and listing some evidence that our model helps
rationalizing, we explain why it does not capture all relevant aspects of the
empirical spectrum.
As for our main assumption, empirical studies point out the existence of
conditional guarantees in both listed and unlisted business groups (Khanna and
Palepu (2000); Gopalan et al. (2007), Deloof and Vershueren (2006)). Rating
agencies are also well aware of this and take intra-group guarantees - as well
as the opposite, namely ring-fencing - into consideration when evaluating credit
risk (Standard & Poor￿ s(2001)). For instance, a study by Emery and Cantor
(2005) analyzes the ensuing occurrence of either selective (S only) or multiple
(both H and S) defaults in a sample of 670 non-￿nancial U.S. HS structures,
including 1741 rated ￿rms.
As for our results, we now describe some observations that witness the dif-
fusion of Holding-Subsidiary structures and their higher debt and tax savings
with respect to competing organizations.
Holding-Subsidiary structures embedding conditional guarantees are indeed
pervasive. For instance, they are the norm in both emerging markets (Khanna
and Yafeh (2007)) and continental European countries (De Jong et al. (2009),
Barca and Becht, 2001). They are also present in innovative industries in the
US and the UK (Allen (1998); Sahlman (1990); Mathews and Robinson (2008)),
as well as in the private equity groups.15 Risk taking in the banking industry
appears to be related with the presence of intercompany guarantees as well
(Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez (2010)), which can be imposed by the Federal Reserve
(Herring and Carmassi (2009)).
see the case of Table 4.
15Conditional guarantees are implicit in private equity. Partners need to periodically raise
funds in the market because of the limited temporal commitments of ￿nanciers, and this is
possible only if their reputation concerning participation in restructurings is good. Moreover,
the managers of LBO targets receive bonuses only when they repay their debt obligations.
See Jensen (2007).
18As far as debt ￿nancing is concerned, group a¢ liates do appear to rely on
it more than comparable Stand Alone ￿rms (Masulis et al. (2008), Deloof and
Vershueren (2006)), consistent with our analytical results. This is especially
true in the case of leveraged buy-outs, a situation where our assumption of no
agency costs applies reasonably well. In such a stylized world, our results point
to zero debt in the Holding company and a highly levered Subsidiary. In the
real world, the private equity fund is unlevered while portfolio ￿rms display
extraordinary debt levels (Kaplan (1989)). In Table 1 the tax burden of debt
drops from 17.70% of operating cash-￿ ow of a non-guaranteed ￿rm (that we
may consider as a Stand Alone public company) to 5.39% for a guaranteed one
(the LBO portfolio ￿rm). Kaplan (1989) reports that, in ￿rms taken private,
the tax burden dropped from 20% to 4.8% in the third year.
We did not ￿nd data comparing HS￿ s tax savings to those of competing or-
ganizations. However, we see that 22% of cross-country variation in Subsidiary
leverage of US multinationals￿subsidiaries is explained by cross-country varia-
tion in tax rates (Desai et al. (2004)). Moreover, we indirectly understand the
relevance of tax savings and guarantees in HS since several countries (includ-
ing Australia, China, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, UK and the US) adopt
rules limiting interest deductions if the debt-equity ratio or interest expenses
exceed certain thresholds. These rules are called "thin capitalisation" as large
interest deductions go together with high leverage - as in our simulations. For
instance, Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (INTM541010) explains that "thin
capitalisation commonly arises where a company is funded by another company
in the same group. It can also arise where funding is provided to a company by
a third party, typically a bank, but with guarantees or other forms of comfort
provided to the lender by another group company or companies (typically the
overseas Holding company). The e⁄ect of funding a UK company or companies
with excessive intra-group or Parentally- guaranteed debt is, potentially, exces-
sive interest deductions. It is the possibility of excessive deductions for interest
which the UK legislation on thin capitalisation seeks to counteract."
In practice, we also observe Stand Alone organizations that in our set up
should not exist, and Mergers that should not exist if correlation between ac-
tivities￿cash ￿ ows is high enough. We discuss below some of our simplifying
assumptions, such as credible guarantees, no frictions and no regulation, that
could be relaxed so as to re￿ ect such empirical regularities.
Our model posits credibility of the conditional guarantee, which can be as-
sociated for instance to enforceability in court. In practice, alternative juris-
dictions ensure di⁄erent degrees of lenders￿protection associated with the same
guarantee (Herring and Carmassi (2009)). Moreover, within a given jurisdiction,
the parties may write alternative contracts that make the ensuing guarantee
more or less binding. Comfort letters, that are legally unenforceable promises
of rescue sent by the Holding company to Subsidiary￿ s lenders, are also common
(Boot et al. (1993)) and derive their credibility from the guarantor￿ s reputation.
Herring and Carmassi (2009) cite cases of ￿nancial institutions providing addi-
tional funds to troubled SIV, despite the absence of legal obligations, so as to
protect their reputation. When we embed these less-than-fully credible guaran-
19tees in numerical simulations of our model, the Merger may become an optimal
arrangement also for higher cash ￿ ow correlations, because the unconditional
guarantee is more reliable than the conditional one. This reconciles our theoret-
ical conclusions with empirical evidence, in which Holding-Subsidiary structures
coexist with Mergers, both under di⁄erent legislations and under the same one.
Financial frictions associated with ￿rm combinations may also explain the
coexistence of HS and Stand Alone ￿rms. For instance, previous models high-
light that internal capital markets, which are present inside both Mergers and
HS, may distort allocations (see Inderst and Mueller (2003), Faure-Grimaud and
Inderst (2005), Rajan et al. (2000)); and that shareholders￿heterogeneity may
lead to minority shareholders expropriation in groups (Almeida and Wolfenzon
(2006)). Non-￿nancial frictions and diseconomies of scale may similarly explain
discrepancies between our frictionless model and reality, if they generate a cost
of HS which o⁄sets the ￿nancial synergy we uncover.
Last but not least, regulation has been targeting complex organizations in
certain countries - for instance in the US since the New Deal (see Morck (2005)).
Regulation is absent in our frictionless model.
The reader may ￿nally object that conditional guarantees go hand-in-hand
with intercorporate ownership, while in this version of our model the Holding
company does not hold any shares in the Subsidiary. Unreported simulations
indicate that the fully-credible conditional guarantees are insensitive to inter-
corporate ownership, because the Subsidiary is hardly ever able to distribute
dividends due to its debt obligations. When we numerically assess the case of
less credible guarantees, the Subsidiary becomes able to pay a dividend thanks
to its lower debt service. In turn the Holding company may lever up, the more
so the higher are its dividend receipts. This makes the value of the conditional
guarantee sensitive to ownership only when it is not fully credible.
7 Conclusions and extensions
This paper provides new insights on intercorporate guarantees and ￿rm scope.
Up to our knowledge, it models for the ￿rst time the provision of these guar-
antees, the associated optimal leverage and their impact on tax savings net of
default costs. Given the correspondence between conditional guarantees and
HS, our model o⁄ers a rationale for the di⁄usion of Holding-Subsidiary struc-
tures without relying on previous insights relating to internal capital markets
and expropriation of minority shareholders. It also explains their observed re-
liance on debt and their high tax gains, which appear to be of concern to tax
authorities around the world.
Importantly, our model is just a ￿rst step towards a better understanding
of intercorporate guarantees in Holding companies and their subsidiaries, as it
relies on a simple static setting with two activities and no agency problems.
Developments relying on more general settings are postponed to further work.
20The ￿rst obvious extension would be to allow for more than two ￿rms. The
logic of our characterization of the Holding company suggests that the features
of the third (or N-th) ￿rm - namely its relative default costs, tax rate and size -
will determine whether it will act as a guarantor to or a bene￿ciary of the initial
H and S. Debt seniority will then emerge endogenously among the members of
the enlarged pool.
The comparative welfare properties of HS also appear to deserve further
attention, as they may be socially wasteful despite being value maximizing.
Unreported simulations show that the joint default probability of H and S with
conditional guarantees is very low. Still, they indicate that HS appear to incur
into much higher bankruptcy costs than competing organization when they do
go bankrupt, despite the provision of a guarantee to lenders and the absence of
moral hazard. This perspective may also shed light on the recent crisis, triggered
by institutions that were interconnected and had large leverage.
8 Appendix A
8.1 The optimization problem without guarantees
This Appendix studies the maximization of ￿rm value with respect to non-
negative debt levels, Pi ￿ 0; with i = 1;2; through its equivalent problem,
namely the minimization of the tax burden plus default costs. The optimal
debt results from trading o⁄ these e⁄ects, as known from seminal results by
Kim (1978), among others. We ￿rst establish some properties of the market
value of debt:
Lemma 8.1 Debt is increasing less than proportionally in the face value of
debt:





Proof. Observe ￿rst that, as default costs and taxes approach zero, we have:
0 ￿ dD0i(Pi)=dPi = (1 ￿ Fi(Pi))￿ ￿ ￿ < 1





= (1 ￿ Fi(0))￿ > 0
since the probability that Xi is positive is positive (Fi(0) < 1).
For positive default cost and tax rates, when closed form expressions for




The non-negativity of dD0i(Pi)=dPi is proved in Regis (dissertation). In
order to demonstrate that dD0i(Pi)=dPi < 1 we use the fact that risky debt D0i
21can be written as the di⁄erence between the corresponding riskless debt, Pi￿,
and lenders￿discounted expected loss.
The ￿rst part of the proof proceeds by contradiction. Thus assume instead
dD0i(Pi)=dPi ￿ 1: Observe that the derivative of riskless debt with respect to
the face value of debt (￿) is smaller than one. In order for the risky debt to
have a derivative not smaller than one, the discounted expected loss should
have a derivative smaller than zero, i.e. it should decrease in the face value of
debt. This contradicts the minimal requirement that both default probability
and expected default costs increase in the face value of debt:
As for the limit when the principal tends to zero, let limPi!0+
dD0i(Pi)
dPi ￿ 0.
This implies that the discounted expected loss has a derivative, when Pi ! 0+,
positive and not smaller than ￿. This in turn implies that lenders￿expected loss
has a derivative greater than one with respect to debt , which is absurd.
This Lemma implies that both the tax shield and the default threshold are
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dPi = 1 + ￿
1￿￿
dD0i(Pi)
dPi ￿ 1 (27)
Now we show that lemma 3.1 holds.
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Conditions (29) are necessary and su¢ cient if Ti + DCi is convex in Pi ￿ 0.























i = 0. If ￿ > 0, then a minimum at Pi = 0 cannot exist, since the ￿rst
condition in (29) is violated. The optimum is interior, and (30) is set to zero.
9 Appendix B - Optimal guarantees
9.1 Proofs of lemma 3.2, theorems 4.2 and 4.3
We ￿rst prove a lemma which characterizes savings in default costs ￿.
22Lemma 9.1 ￿ a) is non increasing in PH and has a null derivative if and only
if PS = 0; b) has a null derivative with respect to PS at PS = 0; c) is decreasing
in PS when the latter diverges.
Proof. Part (a) requires @￿
































5 ￿ 0 (31)
which is true by (27).
Equality in (31) holds if and only if the third term is zero, that is Xd
S =
XZ
S = 0, which in turn happens if and only if PS = 0.





























































































When PS = 0, then Xd
S = XZ
S = 0; all the integrals vanish and the previous
derivative is null.











For ￿xed y, limx!+1 xf(x;y) = 0 - since f is a density - implies that, for
any sequence xn which goes to +1, then xnf(xn;y) converges to zero. We
suppose that the function fn(y) satis￿es the dominated convergence property.


































































and proves part (c).
We are now ready to prove lemma 3.2.
Proof. Let us examine the KT conditions for a minimum of the total tax
burden and default costs of the Holding and Subsidiary, namely
THS + DCHS , TH + DCH + TS + DCS
with respect to non-negative Subsidiary debt. Recall that such conditions are


















































Let us examine whether the KT conditions are satis￿ed at PS = 0. As a
consequence of part (b) of the previous lemma, if P￿

























where the last term follows from (30), since Xd
S = XZ
S = 0 when PS = 0. Such






by lemma 8.1. The KT conditions are then violated when the Subsidiary is un-
levered. This concludes the proof.
We are now ready for the proof of theorem 4.2
24Proof. Consider part i). Under the convexity assumption, the KT conditions
for a minimum of THS +DCHS; with respect to non-negative debt for both the





2 := K (36)
are necessary and su¢ cient. They are equal to:
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <



























@PH = ￿1 + ￿3 (i)
P￿
H ￿ 0 (ii)
￿1P￿



























@PS = ￿2 + ￿3 (iv)
P￿
S ￿ 0 (v)
￿2P￿
S = 0 (vi)
P￿
H + P￿
S ￿ K (vii)
￿3(P￿
H + P￿
S ￿ K) = 0 (viii)
￿1 ￿ 0;￿2 ￿ 0;￿3 ￿ 0 (ix)
(37)
We temporarily ignore constraints (vii) and (viii), and set ￿3 = 0 in (i);(iv)
and (ix). We want to demonstrate that there exists a point (0;P￿
S) which solves
them. All the conditions but (iv) are easy to discuss.















The left-hand side is positive at PH = P￿
1 , since the ￿rst two derivatives are null
and ￿@￿=@PH > 0 (by part (a) of lemma 9.1 and lemma 3.2, which rules out
P￿
S = 0). The ￿rst two terms on the left hand side are negative, if P￿
H < P￿
1 ,
given convexity of Ti + DCi for a Stand Alone. We also know that the third
term (￿@￿=@PH) is still positive if P￿
H < P￿
1 . When P￿
H ! 0, the left-hand side
of (38) cannot be negative, since this would contradict the convexity assumption
on the objective function. Thus P￿
H = 0 and conditions (i;ii;iii) are satis￿ed
















If later we choose P￿
S > 0, also conditions (v;vi) are satis￿ed, provided that
we select ￿2 = 0. Given that we chose ￿1 ￿ 0;￿2 = ￿3 = 0, condition (ix) holds.
Let us turn to condition (iv), which has to provide us with a choice P￿
S > 0. In














Consider its left-hand side as a function of PS, denoting it with ￿(PS) We know
from the limit behavior of ￿ (part (b) of lemma 9.1)) and from convexity of the
25Stand Alone taxes and default costs (T2 + DC2), that ￿ has a negative limit
when the Subsidiary debt tends to zero, and a positive limit (even non ￿nite)
when PS diverges. It follows that there exists a positive debt level which satis￿es
condition (39). This proves part i) of the theorem, since all the KT conditions
are satis￿ed.
Let us turn to part ii). We want to demonstrate that there exists a point
(0;P￿
S), with P￿
S > K, which solves conditions (i) to (ix). As above, we start
by considering all the conditions but (iv), which requires some caution.
We are interested in a solution for which the constraint (vii) is not binding,
implying ￿3 = 0 in condition (viii). As above, we choose P￿
H = 0 and let














@PH . Thus P￿
H and ￿1 ￿ 0 satisfy conditions (i;ii;iii). If later we also
choose P￿
S > K, conditions (v;vi;vii) are satis￿ed as well, provided that we
select ￿2 = 0. Given that we chose ￿1 ￿ 0;￿2 = ￿3 = 0, both conditions
(viii;ix) hold.
Let us turn to condition (iv), which has to provide us with a choice P￿
S > K.
In view of the other conditions, (iv) becomes again (39). We are going to show
that, under the conditions posited sub (ii), ￿(P￿
1 + P￿




2 . We have:
￿(P￿
1 + P￿























































S are the default and tax shield thresholds corresponding
to PS = P￿
1 + P￿









































































































which is the condition in the theorem. This proves part ii).
We then consider theorem 4.3.
Proof. i) In order to increase value, we need to decrease the following function:
THS(PH;PS) + DCHS(PH;PS) =
= T1(PH) + T2(PS) + DC1(PH) + DC2(PS) ￿ ￿(PH;PS)
Since the derivative of both T1 + DC1 and T2 + DC2 with respect to their own
arguments is null at the optimum leverage, P￿
1 ;P￿
2 , then the impact of a local
variation depends on the sign of the derivatives of ￿. We know from lemma
9.1 that decreasing the Holding debt increases it at any positive leverage of the
Subsidiary, and therefore reduces THS +DCHS, as needed. Given this, one can
reduce the Holding debt and increase the Subsidiary one so that THS + DCHS
decreases, as follows. We have:
d(THS (P￿
1 ;P￿
2 ) + DCHS (P￿
1 ;P￿






























@PS ; neglect ￿￿ and recognize that such deriv-








































For such couple ￿
p
SdPS > 0. It su¢ ces to take
















@PS < 0 and dPH < 0;in order to demonstrate the
assert we need to show that there exists a variation in PS, starting from P￿
2 ,
of the type dPS = ￿dPH + ";" > 0;dPH < 0; such that the di⁄erential (40) is
negative. This is value increasing and the corresponding principals represent a
























2 )=@PS < 0.
9.2 Proof of theorem 4.4
Recall that ￿m = ￿12 ￿ ￿21. Observe that, as known from the unilateral case,
the derivative of the ￿rst component with respect to the guarantor￿ s debt is
non-positive. It is null i⁄ the guaranteed party￿ s debt is null, i.e. PS = 0:
























5 ￿ 0 (41)
It is null i⁄ guaranteed party￿ s debt is null, i.e PH = 0: The derivative of the




However, we know from Appendix B that it is null when the guaranteed
party￿ s debt PS is high enough (since its limit for PS ! 1 is negative) and
when it is null, or PS = 0: Similarly, the derivative of the second component

































Due to the symmetry with respect to the ￿rst, also this derivative is null when
the guaranteed party￿ s debt PH is high enough (since its limit for PH ! 1 is
negative) and when it is null, i.e. PH = 0:
Given these properties, let us proceed to the proof of theorem 4.4.
Proof. We demonstrate separately that i) unilateral guarantees permit to max-
imize the combined value of P and S; ii) there exists a default cost level ￿￿ below
which they are the only optimal guarantees.
Recall that maximizing the value is equivalent to minimizing the tax burden




T1(PH) + DC1(PH) + T2(PS) + DC2(PS)+
￿ ￿12 (PH;PS) ￿ ￿21(PH;PS)
￿
(43)
When one of the principals is null, the conditions for optimality of the pre-
vious function collapse into the ones for optimality with ￿12 only in place (if
PH = 0), or ￿21 only in place (if PS = 0).
For case i), we prove that there is an optimum characterized by a unilateral
guarantee from 1 to 2 - ￿12(0;P￿
S) - where P￿
S is exactly the principal which
maximized the conditional one-way guarantee. The existence of an optimum in
￿21(P￿
H;0) can be demonstrated in a perfectly symmetrical way.

































In this case, we know from Appendix B that (44) admit a positive solution
P￿
S > K. As a consequence, the group value is maximized by ￿12(0;P￿
S); as
needed.
We can now proceed to the proof of part ii). We want to provide conditions
under which the system of KT conditions for maximality of a mutual guarantee
has no solutions other than the corner ones (PH or PS = 0). Otherwise said, we
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The two derivatives are null when:
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> > > > > > > > > > > > <




















































































































dP2 ) are positive and bounded; the integrals
are positive and bounded too, since both the tax shields and the default thresh-




H < 1. In particular, the last integral,















H Prf(X1 > Xd
S;X2 = Xd
H) < 1

















It follows that there exists an ￿￿ below which the rhs and the lhs cannot be equal.
Below ￿￿ there is no maximum with bilateral instead of unilateral guarantee.
9.3 Proof of proposition 4.1
Proof. i) With equally distributed cash ￿ ows and equal parameters (￿i =
















30and the value di⁄erence is null. Indi⁄erence between ￿rm 1 being a bene￿ciary
or a guarantor follows.
ii) recall that, under the convexity assumption, the guarantor is unlevered:
P￿
iH = 0;i = 1;2. Its default threshold and tax shield are null: XZ
iH = Xd
iH = 0.
On the tax side, this implies that16Ti(P￿
iH) = Ti(0):
On the default-cost side, the unlevered guarantor has no expected default
costs: DCi(P￿
iH) = DCi(0) = 0: This means that the default cost savings -










We provide conditions under which this inequality is satis￿ed when debt of the
Subsidiary does not optimize the ￿rst guarantee, but optimizes the second. To
do this, we assume now that P2S = P￿
1S (instead of P2S = P￿
2S). A fortiori,
it will be satis￿ed when the Subsidiary debt in the ￿rst guarantee is optimized
(P2S = P￿
2S).
In order to examine the case of di⁄erent default costs we need to assume
X1 = X2 and ￿i = ￿. If P2S = P￿
1S; together with X1 = X2 and ￿i = ￿, then
T1(P￿
1S) = T2(P￿












Notice that - since X1 = X2 and P2S = P￿
1S - the expectations are equal. The








which is true if and only if ￿1 > ￿2. The condition is necessary and su¢ -
cient when P2S = P￿
1S, it becomes su¢ cient when P2S is optimized in the ￿rst
guarantee.
In order to examine the case of di⁄erent tax rates we need to assume X1 = X2
and ￿i = ￿. A reasoning similar to the previous one leads ￿rst to DC1(P￿
1S) =
DC2(P2S) and then to ￿12 > ￿21being satis￿ed if and only if ￿1 < ￿2; when
P2S = P￿
1S. The condition is necessary and su¢ cient when P2S = P￿
1S, it
becomes su¢ cient when P2S is optimized in the ￿rst guarantee.
iii) In order to examine the impact of size, we provide conditions under which
￿rm 1 guarantees ￿rm 2 even though the principals are the optimal ones for a






16The di⁄erential tax burdens between being a G and a B coincide with tax savings, as




31Indeed, if this equality holds, a fortiori it will hold when the ￿rst guarantee is








If the principals are (P￿
1S;P￿
2H) , then the di⁄erence in tax burden for each
￿rm, under di⁄erent guarantees, is null (recall indeed that taxes do not di⁄er in

























On the lhs you have the default costs which ￿rm 1 (when levered as a
Subsidiary) incurs when ￿rm 2 is unable to rescue her, since X2 < h(X1).
On the rhs the same quantity for ￿rm 2, evaluated at P￿
2H.
9.4 Proof of theorem 4.5
Proof. Let us add to and subtract from the value di⁄erential ￿0HS(PH;PS) ￿
￿0M(PM) the value of two Stand Alone ￿rms with cash ￿ ows XH = X1;XS =
X2:
￿0HS(PH;PS) ￿ ￿0M(PM) (48)
= [￿0HS(PH;PS) ￿ ￿01(P1) ￿ ￿02(P2)] ￿ [￿0M(PM) ￿ ￿01(P1) ￿ ￿02(P2)] (49)
We know that the content of the ￿rst square brackets is always positive (non-
negative without convexity) at the optimum. The content of the second one
is











M)+ ￿ E(X1 ￿ XZ
















It cannot be signed without additional assumptions. We are going to show that
- at the optimum - it is null under (i) and non-positive under (ii) and (iii).
(i) Consider the case of equally distributed cash ￿ ows for the two merged
activities, and denote their common value as X: Notice that (a) the correspond-
ing Stand Alone ￿rms have the same optimal debt and cash-￿ ow thresholds,
32namely Pi = P￿;Xd
i = Xd;XZ
i = XZ;i = 1;2 (b) the volatility of 2X is
twice the one of X, if ￿ = 1. Since in this case the Merger can be thought
of as a Stand Alone with double cash ￿ ow and double volatility, homogene-


















The di⁄erential tax burden is null:
￿￿[E(XM ￿ XZ
M)+ ￿ E(X1 ￿ XZ
1 )+ ￿ E(X2 ￿ XZ
2 )+] =






))+] = 0 (51)






















As a result, the value of M and two Stand Alone ￿rms coincide. Summing up,




1 ) ￿ ￿02(P￿
2 ) > 0;
￿0M(P￿
M) ￿ ￿01(P￿
1 ) ￿ ￿02(P￿
2 ) = 0
Thus the value di⁄erential is positive.
(ii) Let the cash ￿ ows be Gaussian with the same volatility (even with dif-
ferent means), and let their volatility satisfy condition (ii). Then Proposition 2
in Leland (2007) indicates that there exists a correlation coe¢ cient ￿Q such that
the second-square-bracket content in (48) is negative (Merger is undesirable),
when evaluated at P￿
M, provided that correlation is greater than ￿Q and less
than perfect. For perfect correlation it is null.
(iii) If cash ￿ ows are Gaussian with di⁄erent volatilities, then we know from
Proposition 4 in Leland (2007) that there exists a correlation coe¢ cient ￿R such
that the second-square-bracket content in (48) is negative, when evaluated at
P￿
M, provided that correlation is greater than ￿R and less than perfect. For
perfect correlation it is null.
In cases ii) and iii) it follows that the value di⁄erential is positive (non-
negative).
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l
u
m
n
1
/
2
H
S
a
l
l
t
h
e
e
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
a
r
i
t
h
m
e
t
i
c
m
e
a
n
o
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
H
a
n
d
S
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
r
a
t
i
o
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
D
￿
0
S
+
D
￿
0
H
￿
￿
0
H
S
:
T
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
M
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
l
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
a
M
e
r
g
e
r
.
38T
a
b
l
e
2
:
A
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
c
o
s
t
s
:
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d
v
a
l
u
e
S
A
S
A
1
/
2
S
A
H
S
1
/
2
H
S
1
/
2
M
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
C
o
s
t
s
(
%
)
￿
7
5
2
3
7
5
2
3
4
9
F
a
c
e
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
D
e
b
t
P
￿
3
3
5
7
.
1
0
4
5
.
0
5
0
2
2
0
1
1
0
4
6
.
5
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
T
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
X
d
￿
3
9
.
2
4
7
6
7
.
6
5
-
0
2
4
9
.
2
7
-
5
5
.
4
2
T
a
x
S
h
i
e
l
d
X
Z
￿
8
.
0
1
1
4
.
8
9
-
0
1
0
2
.
9
3
-
1
0
.
7
9
L
e
v
e
r
e
d
F
i
r
m
V
a
l
u
e
￿
￿
0
=
D
￿
0
+
E
￿
0
8
0
.
8
3
8
1
.
4
7
8
1
.
1
5
4
9
.
4
6
1
1
7
.
1
3
8
3
.
2
9
8
1
.
2
4
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
R
a
t
i
o
(
%
)
D
￿
0
=
￿
￿
0
3
0
.
9
2
5
1
.
8
1
4
1
.
3
7
0
9
9
.
9
7
0
.
2
6
4
3
.
9
6
T
a
x
S
a
v
i
n
g
s
o
f
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
T
S
￿
0
1
.
2
5
2
.
3
2
1
.
7
9
0
1
4
.
6
2
7
.
3
1
1
.
6
9
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
C
o
s
t
s
D
C
￿
0
0
.
4
6
0
.
8
9
0
.
6
8
0
8
.
1
3
4
.
0
7
0
.
4
6
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
g
u
a
r
a
n
t
e
e
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿
￿
0
1
￿
￿
￿
0
2
4
.
2
9
0
.
1
7
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
w
h
o
s
e
u
n
i
t
s
d
i
⁄
e
r
i
n
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
c
o
s
t
s
￿
:
O
t
h
e
r
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
a
r
e
s
e
t
t
o
t
h
e
b
a
s
e
c
a
s
e
.
T
h
e
S
A
,
H
a
n
d
S
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
a
S
t
a
n
d
A
l
o
n
e
u
n
i
t
,
a
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
a
n
d
i
t
s
S
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
,
t
a
k
i
n
g
i
n
t
o
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
h
a
s
h
i
g
h
e
r
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
c
o
s
t
s
.
I
n
t
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
H
S
e
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
a
r
i
t
h
m
e
t
i
c
m
e
a
n
o
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
H
a
n
d
S
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
r
a
t
i
o
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
D
￿
0
S
+
D
￿
0
H
￿
￿
0
H
S
:
T
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
M
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
l
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
a
M
e
r
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
D
C
o
f
t
h
e
M
e
r
g
e
r
a
r
e
s
e
t
t
o
t
h
e
a
r
i
t
h
m
e
t
i
c
m
e
a
n
o
f
2
3
%
a
n
d
7
5
%
.
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a
b
l
e
3
:
A
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
S
A
S
A
1
/
2
S
A
H
S
1
/
2
H
S
1
/
2
M
V
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
(
%
)
￿
1
5
2
7
.
5
1
8
1
1
5
2
7
.
5
1
8
1
3
2
.
6
3
F
a
c
e
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
D
e
b
t
P
￿
6
1
6
0
6
0
.
5
0
2
1
5
1
0
7
.
5
5
8
.
5
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
T
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
X
d
￿
7
2
.
7
0
6
7
.
6
5
-
0
2
4
3
.
6
0
-
6
9
.
6
4
T
a
x
S
h
i
e
l
d
X
Z
￿
1
4
.
1
9
1
7
.
7
5
-
0
1
0
0
.
6
0
-
1
3
.
9
4
L
e
v
e
r
e
d
F
i
r
m
V
a
l
u
e
￿
￿
0
=
D
￿
0
+
E
￿
0
8
1
.
6
9
8
1
.
7
1
8
1
.
7
0
5
2
.
8
7
1
1
4
.
8
4
8
3
.
8
6
8
1
.
5
7
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
R
a
t
i
o
(
%
)
D
￿
0
=
￿
￿
0
5
7
.
3
1
5
1
.
7
1
5
4
.
5
0
0
9
7
.
3
6
6
8
.
2
1
5
4
.
6
2
T
a
x
S
a
v
i
n
g
s
o
f
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
T
S
￿
0
2
.
2
2
2
.
7
1
2
.
4
7
0
1
3
.
7
4
6
.
8
7
2
.
1
8
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
C
o
s
t
s
D
C
￿
0
0
.
5
3
1
.
2
7
0
.
9
0
0
6
.
2
9
3
.
1
5
0
.
6
1
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
G
u
a
r
a
n
t
e
e
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿
￿
0
1
￿
￿
￿
0
2
4
.
3
2
-
0
.
2
6
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
w
h
o
s
e
u
n
i
t
s
d
i
⁄
e
r
i
n
c
a
s
h
￿
o
w
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
￿
:
O
t
h
e
r
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
a
r
e
s
e
t
t
o
t
h
e
b
a
s
e
c
a
s
e
.
T
h
e
S
A
,
H
a
n
d
S
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
a
S
t
a
n
d
A
l
o
n
e
u
n
i
t
,
a
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
a
n
d
i
t
s
S
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
,
t
a
k
i
n
g
i
n
t
o
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
h
a
s
l
o
w
e
r
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
.
I
n
t
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
H
S
a
l
l
t
h
e
e
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
a
r
i
t
h
m
e
t
i
c
m
e
a
n
o
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
H
a
n
d
S
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
r
a
t
i
o
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
s
i
m
p
l
y
D
￿
0
S
+
D
￿
0
H
￿
￿
0
H
S
:
T
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
M
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
l
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
a
M
e
r
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
M
e
r
g
e
r
i
s
,
b
y
d
e
￿
n
i
t
i
o
n
,
t
h
e
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
i
t
s
c
a
s
h
￿
o
w
s
.
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a
b
l
e
4
:
A
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
s
i
z
e
S
A
S
A
1
/
2
S
A
H
S
1
/
2
H
S
1
/
2
M
C
a
s
h
F
l
o
w
S
i
z
e
1
/
3
5
/
3
1
5
/
3
1
/
3
1
1
F
a
c
e
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
D
e
b
t
P
￿
1
9
9
5
5
7
6
8
1
2
1
9
4
.
5
5
7
.
5
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
T
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
X
d
￿
2
2
.
5
0
1
1
2
.
5
4
6
7
.
5
2
7
2
.
0
8
1
3
4
.
0
6
-
6
7
.
8
1
T
a
x
S
h
i
e
l
d
X
Z
￿
4
.
9
8
2
4
.
8
5
1
4
.
9
2
1
6
.
3
1
5
2
.
2
5
-
1
3
.
7
6
5
L
e
v
e
r
e
d
F
i
r
m
V
a
l
u
e
￿
￿
0
=
D
￿
0
+
E
￿
0
2
7
.
1
6
1
3
5
.
7
8
8
1
.
4
7
9
7
.
3
8
6
8
.
7
5
8
3
.
0
6
8
1
.
4
9
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
R
a
t
i
o
(
%
)
D
￿
0
=
￿
￿
0
5
1
.
7
3
5
1
.
7
3
5
1
.
7
3
5
3
.
0
8
1
0
0
7
1
.
9
5
5
3
.
0
6
T
a
x
S
a
v
i
n
g
s
o
f
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
T
S
￿
0
0
.
7
7
3
.
8
5
2
.
3
1
2
.
5
4
6
.
2
3
4
.
3
9
2
.
2
3
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
C
o
s
t
s
D
C
￿
0
0
.
3
0
1
.
4
8
0
.
8
9
0
.
4
7
2
.
2
6
1
.
3
6
0
.
7
5
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
G
u
a
r
a
n
t
e
e
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿
￿
0
1
￿
￿
￿
0
2
3
.
1
9
0
.
0
4
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
w
h
o
s
e
u
n
i
t
s
d
i
⁄
e
r
i
n
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
c
a
s
h
￿
o
w
s
.
T
h
e
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
u
n
i
t
h
a
s
s
i
z
e
￿
i
=
1
=
3
￿
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
a
r
g
e
r
h
a
s
￿
i
=
5
=
3
￿
;
w
h
e
r
e
￿
=
1
2
7
:
6
3
.
A
s
a
c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
,
t
h
e
s
i
z
e
o
f
H
S
a
n
d
M
i
s
2
.
O
t
h
e
r
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
a
r
e
s
e
t
t
o
t
h
e
b
a
s
e
c
a
s
e
.
T
h
e
S
A
,
H
a
n
d
S
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
a
S
t
a
n
d
A
l
o
n
e
u
n
i
t
,
a
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
a
n
d
i
t
s
S
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
,
t
a
k
i
n
g
i
n
t
o
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
h
a
s
b
i
g
g
e
r
s
i
z
e
.
I
n
t
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
H
S
a
l
l
t
h
e
e
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
a
r
i
t
h
m
e
t
i
c
m
e
a
n
o
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
H
a
n
d
S
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
r
a
t
i
o
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
s
i
m
p
l
y
D
￿
0
S
+
D
￿
0
H
￿
￿
0
H
S
:
T
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
1
/
2
M
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
l
f
t
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
s
o
f
a
M
e
r
g
e
r
.
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